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Abstract 
Myanmar is undergoing profound socio-political transitions, including rapid developments of its 
telecommunication infrastructures and related policy frameworks that involves both infrastructural and 
governance challenges. By focusing on the various stages of the connectivity building plan over the first 3 years 
since its launch in 2012, this paper explores how Myanmar is developing its internet policy capacity building, in 
the framework of the broader transnational internet governance debate. In particular, this paper addresses 
whether and how the new national telecom infrastructure and the related governance framework has been 
designed and implemented in respect of digital rights, notably freedom of expression and right of privacy. By 
process tracing the initiatives shaping the on-going connectivity building plan, the paper discusses the role of 
actors involved in this process, including civil society organizations, private companies, and foreign 
governments; whether we are witnessing any bottom up forms of internet governance practices; opportunities 
and eventual threats for citizens related to the implementation this connectivity plan; and finally, it tests and 
proposes a novel empirically driven theoretical framework aiming at expanding our understanding on the 
diffusion of global internet governance norms in developing connectivity in post-authoritarian contexts. 
Keywords: Internet Governance, Internet and Human Rights, Telecom Reform, Connectivity Building, Capacity Building,   
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1. Introduction 
In the midst of rapid socio-political transitions, with one of the lowest internet and mobile 
subscriber rates in the world, Myanmar is building its telecommunications infrastructure, 
which involves opening its market to international mobile companies, engaging in national 
regulatory reform, and developing its internet policy capacity. Although the domestic 
connectivity plan is moving quickly forward, following decades of political repression 
several challenges need to be dealt from both an infrastructural and a policy perspective in 
order to secure an open and free digital environment. This paper explores the fast 
developing connectivity developments in Myanmar, paying particular attention to the 
opening of the mobile market to international companies, the launch of the new national 
telecom law, the policy developments securing digital rights, and how this is happening in 
the context of broader internet governance discourses. 
 
Based on fieldwork conducted since 2013 and interviews with key actors involved in the 
telecom developments, including local civil society organizations, CEOs of new 
international mobile operators developing the digital infrastructure, and by tracing the 
process leading to a national telecom reform, this paper addresses these developments, 
paying particular attention to: 1) Understanding the role of the various actors involved in 
this process, scrutinizing in particular whether and how the government is still controlling 
the process; how national civil society organizations are able to influence such a process 
from the bottom up; and the role played by international actors, including international 
telecom companies, 2) how wider global internet governance norms are adapted to the 
Myanmar context via a top-down approach, or whether we can rather describe Myanmar as 
a bottom-up internet governance case, and finally, 3) whether this process is able to ensure 
a human rights-based development of national digital telecommunication infrastructure. 
 
2. Context  
 
According to international rankings, Myanmar is the country with the lowest number of 
internet users and mobile subscribers, followed only by North Korea: in 2011, the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) reported an internet penetration rate of 
0.98% and 1.3 million mobile subscribers, representing 2.3% of the population. These 
mobile users subscribed to the only mobile company active in the country which, together 
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with its subsidiaries, is controlled by the state-owned Myanmar Post and 
Telecommunications (MPT).2   
 
Traveling in Myanmar reveals that the observed telecommunications reality varies 
significantly from the official data available about Internet infrastructure and mobile 
penetration. In cities such as Yangon, Mandalay and Bagan, internet and open WiFi are 
already available, mobile phones shops are widely distributed over the country, ultimate 
generation Smart Phones are broadly used. Despite recent telecommunications 
improvements, Myanmar has just started to build its connectivity, and it is expected that 
obstacles will emerge as the country’s progress advances. For instance, much of the 
infrastructure building will occur in Myanmar’s vast rural territory. Armed groups control 
parts of this area, which is rife with landmines, making these remote sections of Myanmar 
even more inaccessible and concerning to mobile tower suppliers involved in infrastructure 
construction. Additionally, Myanmar will face challenges in creating and implementing 
telecommunication and regulatory reforms. In countries in political transition, increased 
connectivity, along with its benefits, has the potential to expose citizens to new threats of 
surveillance and control. A regulatory framework securing the respect of human rights, 
notably the freedom of expression and citizens’ right to privacy, should thus accompany 
the development of Myanmar’s telecom infrastructure. However, the scarcity of local 
internet policy development capability and limited number of civil society organization 
active in the country does not facilitate a contribution to the connectivity policy 
development from the bottom up.  
 
1. Developing Internet Governance Capacity Building 
Due to its isolation and lack of digital infrastructure, Myanmar has been excluded from the 
broader internet governance debate taking place internationally, leading to limited local 
internet policy competence and public opinion on how to develop a regulatory framework 
securing connectivity as a public good. The internal debate addressing the governance of 
such a process is therefore currently developing together with the building of the physical 
digital infrastructure. In this context, following decades of autocratic rule, key questions 
emerge about how to implement national internet governance norms securing the 
development of connectivity infrastructure in respect of basic rights for citizens. The 
                                                
2 ITU Global ICT Statistics: http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx 
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functioning of digital connectivity is usually ensured by evolving technical protocols, 
international standards and transnational regulations, which are constantly at the center of 
international negotiations, featuring multiple actors from the private sector, transnational 
non-state actors, governments, and civil society organizations (DeNardis, 2013; Mueller, 
2010). The development and implementation of “[…] shared principles, norms, rules, decision-
making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet” is thus defined as 
Internet Governance (Working Group on Internet Governance, 2005). This definition 
refers Internet Governance to all technical and policy discussions around the digital 
connectivity, and as result of this, internet governance debates cover broad and 
multidisciplinary dimensions. As a result of this, Internet Governance has been 
characterized by techno-determinist, on the one hand, and state-centric approaches, on the 
other (Bendrath, 2009; Eriksson & Giacomello, 2009). The firsts believe that since the 
decentralized architecture of the internet goes beyond national state borders, no single 
actor nor any centralized steering structure would have the full legitimacy to govern it 
(Drezner, 2008). Therefore, from a techno-determinist perspective, it is commonly held 
that no state or governmental institution are entitled to govern and set a universal 
regulatory framework of the Internet (Brown & Marsden, 2013; Mueller, 2010). Instead, 
Internet Governance is seen as ideally led by agreement between private companies and 
transnational non state actors, while states should play a rather limited role in such 
transnational negotiations (Mueller, 2010). This argument is drawn from the stream of 
scholarly relevant research and politics defining the internet as a cyber-ism, which stresses 
the apparent virtual nature of the internet. On the other hand, policy oriented streams of 
research argues that this idea is misleading: the internet is concrete when it comes to 
building its physical infrastructure, including backbones and internet exchange points 
among others, and its governance depends on actors that do not solely deal with cyber 
agendas, but function also in real life, such as state governments (Nye 2014). This is 
particular true when we refer to governments aiming to exercise their hegemony and 
control over the use of the Internet among their citizens. In the domain of mass 
surveillance, internet filtering and censorship, there is arguably a “return of the state” 
(Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010). Here, despite its transnational decentralized technical nature, 
the use of the Internet happens within legal frameworks applicable within national borders, 
giving legitimacy to national sovereignty over the Internet (Drake, 1993). Empirical 
evidence further supported these arguments more than a decade ago (Mueller, 2002), and 
more recent cases, such as the Arab Spring and the Whistleblowing Snowden case, 
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reinforce this tendency towards more state agency in Internet Governance (Calderaro, 
Gollatz, & Wagner, 2014).  
 
In what follows, we address the role that the Myanmar Government plays in the 
development of national connectivity infrastructure and policy. In particular, this research 
takes this latter stream of scholarly relevant and policy oriented contributions in order to 
develop a better understanding of the connectivity building and the telecom reform 
happening in Myanmar. This case allows us to expand our understanding about how 
Internet Governance norms are contextualized in the connectivity building process taking 
place in Myanmar, and whether any bottom up internet governance practices can be 
detected. 
 
3. Connectivity Plan 
Already in the first months after the power shift in August 2011, the new Myanmar 
government identified the development of national connectivity as a key priority for 
modernizing the country. The various stages of the telecom reform reflect the double goal 
of the government: to connect the country urgently, while at the same time respecting 
international standards, aiming to secure the reform of the national telecom sector in a fair, 
open and transparent way. 
  
Figure 1 - Timeline of the Telecom Developments in Myanmar 
 
As described in Figure 1, the connectivity plan and telecom reform follows a sequence of 
different phases: from January 2012 to July 2012, before assigning the license and 
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launching the international competition, the Myanmar government set the bidding rules 
and designed the call for tenders. Once the rules were set, and following the launch of the 
international competition in August 2012, mobile operators were able to submit their 
proposals until January 25, 2013. As described in details below, in June 2013 the 
government announced the outcome of the competition, and awarded two companies 
licenses. However, given the lack of a national telecom law, mobile operators did not 
actually receive their licenses and were not therefore able to operate in the country and 
launch their services until the released of the law. The design of the telecom law did not 
commence until June 2013 and a draft version of the law was released for public 
consultation in November 2013. In January 2014 the government finally assigned the 
licenses, and operators started to work in the country.  
 
Here, these various stages of connectivity building in Myanmar are clustered and described 
according to the following three-step approach influenced by three complementary yet 
parallel initiatives launched by the Myanmar government: 
 
1) Licensing: A public open international competition for the assignment of telecom 
licensees, and their actual release; 
2) Design and release of a national telecom law: Defining a set of rules guiding the development 
of telecom infrastructure, including licensing regulations, securing an open market, and 
protecting the freedoms of both investors and citizens; 
3) Establishing an independent telecom regulator: Establishing a national telecom regulatory 
agency, independent from the Ministry and its political agenda, ensuring and monitoring 
therefore the application of telecom regulation. 
 
This is the sequence of milestones characterizing the current connectivity plan in Myanmar, 
although, as explored in details below, the experience in implementing these initiatives in 
such a sequence is not necessarily most auspicious to follow. Below, we explore the 
connectivity plan along this three-step approach. 
 
 
3.1 Licensing 
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Of Myanmar’s three telecom development initiatives, licensing is the area that has seen 
most activity. To this day, the Myanmar Post and Telecommunications (MPT), a division 
of the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MCIT), is the owner of 
national communication infrastructures and only landline and mobile operator. 
Furthermore, it controls the entire internet infrastructure by controlling Yatanarpon 
Teleport (YPT), which is the only Internet Service Provider (ISP) in the county. In this 
preliminary stage of the connectivity building, the government did not aim to maintain its 
already operating state-controlled mobile operator competing in the domestic telecom 
market. In August 2012, therefore, the government opened up the internal 
telecommunication market by launching a call for tender with the aim to involve 
international telecom operators in order to enhance connectivity in the country. Among the 
more than 90 companies vying for the license, in April 2013 the government shortlisted 12 
companies, including: several Asian telecom companies like: the Indian Bharti AirTel; the 
Singapore Telecommunications (SingTel); the Malaysian Axiata, one of the biggest Asian 
telco; the Vietnamese Viettel Group; a joint partnership between France Telecom-Orange 
and the Japanese Marubeni; and consortium of companies involving local partners like: a 
consortium led by Quantum Strategic Partners, whose principal investor is George Soros 
through his Soros Fund Management, partnering with the Jamaican Digicel, and the newly 
established Myanmari Bank Yoma Strategic Holdings; a consortium of both Japanese, 
KDDI and Sumitomo corporation, and the local Myanmar Information and 
Communication Technology Development Corp.; and single runner international 
companies like: the South Africa’s Mobile Telecom Network (MTN) Group, the Swedish 
Millicom International Cellular mostly active in Latin America and Africa, the Qatari 
Ooredoo; and the Norwegian Telenor. Despite being shortlisted, Vodafone in partnership 
with China Mobile withdrew from the competition, after having evaluated that the 
investment was not sufficiently justified by their estimated benefits. 
a) Awarding Criteria 
Conditions for the submission of the bid seriously limited the number of companies 
matching the eligible criteria, excluding de facto single running domestic bidders.3 Licenses 
have been therefore awarded to the companies obtaining the 2 highest combined scores.4 
                                                
3 The evaluation process consisted of 1.500 points to be allocated across bidders. In particular, 1000 points 
were allocated in consideration of eight major criteria: 1) Quality of the Network development plan, including 
the infrastructure plan offered, and coverage of the network (325 points); 2) Strength of the technical plan 
(125 points); 3) Quality of the Marketing strategy, value added services and distribution commitment (125 
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As result, all Asian companies did not gain sufficient points, neither companies bidding in 
partnership with local partners. Finally, the two new mobile phones licenses were finally 
awarded to the Qatari company Ooredoo, and the Norwegian Telenor. Furthermore, once 
assigned the licenses to international operator, the Minister of Post and 
Telecommunication (MPT) has established a new partnership with the Japanese telecom 
company KDDI and Sumitomo corporation in order to transform the formerly state 
controlled mobile operator in a public-private mobile company able to compete as a newly 
licensed third operator. A forth and last mobile licenses expects to be assigned by 2016, 
and a new consortium joining local and international partners will become a new partly 
state-owned mobile operator.  
 
Ooredoo, formerly Qatar Telecom (Qtel),5 is a state-controlled mobile company that holds 
a monopoly on the mobile sector in Qatar. Additionally, Ooredoo Group controls the 
main mobile operators in Kuwait (Wataniya), Oman (Nawras), Tunisia (Tunisiana), 
Palestine (Wataniya), Maldives (Ooredoo), and Iraq (Asiacell). Algeria it is also transferring 
from its former national mobile operator Nedjma to Ooredoo Algeria, and in Asia 
Ooredoo is primarily active in Indonesia (Indosat).6  
 
Unlike Ooredoo, the Norwegian state-controlled Telenor is already widely operative in 
Southeast Asia, controlling mobile operators in Bangladesh (Grameenphone), India 
(Uninor), Thailand (DTac) and Malaysia (DiGi). Telenor is also active in Sweden, Denmark, 
Hungary, and in the Balkan area, operating as Globul in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria.7  
 
                                                                                                                                          
points); 4) Foreseen tariff for all mobile services, including voice, data, and handsets (75 points); 5) Quality of 
the management of human resources, including its organization and plan to recruit and train local expertise 
(75 points); 6) Customer services and billing quality (50 points); 7) Corporate Social Responsibility of the 
company (50 points); 8) Robustness of the business plan and the financing plan (175 points). Finally, further 
500 points were assigned to the company with the highest spectrum fee offer, assigning to the other bidders 
points proportionated to their offers. 
4  Telecommunications Operator Tender Evaluation and Selection Committee (2013). “Telenor Mobile 
Communications and Ooredoo selected as Successful Applicants in the Nationwide Telecommunications 
Licence Award Process”, 27 June 2013.  
5  More information available at: http://www.ooredoo.com/en/company/who-we-are/our-global-
team/ooredoo-qatar.html 
6 More information available at: http://www.ooredoo.com/en/section/who-we-are/our-global-team 
7 More information available at: http://www.telenor.com/about-us/global-presence/ 
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Together, Ooredoo and Telenor have committed to connect more than 90% of Myanmar 
over the next 5 years. Despite the common commitment to expand connectivity to most of 
the country, their missions in Myanmar diverges in several other aspects, according to 
interviews conducted with company CEOs 8  at Ooredoo, and Telenor. Ooredoo have 
invested 15 Billion $ in the country, promising to develop a 4G high speed data 
transferring infrastructure, while Telenor has invested 3 Billion $ for its mission, with the 
aim to develop mostly a 2G voice infrastructure in rural area and a more geographical 
limited 3G data covering mostly urban area. Given the high resources invested, Ooredoo is 
also intensively engaged in campaigns with the scope to enhance the development of local 
know-how. By sponsoring the organization of public events and training initiatives (such as 
the so-called Hackatons), for example, Ooredoo aims to support the development of 
projects from the bottom up. Telenor is also targeting rural area by supporting initiatives 
aiming to overcome more traditional forms of digital divide.  
b) Connectivity Development and Human Rights: the role of telecom 
companies 
The development of a digital communication infrastructure in a country that has until 
recently demonstrated continued breach of the freedom of expression, some concerns 
about whether the country’s connectivity building will happen in respect of human rights, 
notably the freedom of expression and right to privacy emerge. The international mobile 
operators Ooredoo and Telenor are therefore called to play a role on this matter by 
operating in respect of their corporate social responsibility. In this context, the 2013 
Human Rights Watch report “Reforming Telecommunications in Burma: Human Rights 
and Responsible Investment in Mobile and the Internet” (Human Rights Watch, 2013) 
called for careful evaluation of the country’s telecommunication policy development, and 
telecom development’s potential consequences for digital freedoms. Additionally, in the 
context of internet governance, private companies are often heralded as having a positive 
influence on regulations that support online freedoms. Myanmar’s current telecom 
situation, in which international companies are developing connectivity infrastructure while 
the country develops relevant laws and regulations, is a key case and an important process 
to be followed carefully.  
                                                
8 Interviews to Ross Cormark (Ooredoo) and Petter Furberg (Telenor) consisted of semi-structured interviews 
conducted in both companies’ headquarters in Yangon in February 2014. 
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According to both the “UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” (United 
Nations, 2011) and the EU Commission’s “ICT Sector Guide on Implementing the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” (European Commission, 2013) to 
prove their corporate social responsibility, telecom operators must create a public social 
responsibility policy that includes their commitment to respecting human rights. Ooredoo 
currently does not have a clear policy on corporate social responsibility related to freedom 
of expression and digital rights. In contrast, Ooredoo has in the past accepted the Qatari 
government’s internet censorship request by blocking VoIP – Skype services in the country, 
and by using SmartFilter, an internet filter used also in autocratic regimes including Iran, 
United Arab Emirates, Oman, Sudan, and Tunisia, (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, & 
Zittrain, 2008) to block websites deemed inappropriate for the “national morality and 
customs.” In Myanmar Ooredoo faces additional problems as its perception as a “Muslim” 
company has been negatively received by Myanmar’s Buddhist leaders. 9  As internal 
religious tensions between the country’s 90% Buddhist population and 4-8% Muslim 
minority have caused an increasing number of violent episodes and conflicts, Ooredoo 
faces a serious challenge in easing this potential conflict (International Crisis Group, 2013). 
At the same time, as already stressed above, Ooredoo has invested massive capitals in the 
country, and a good portion of this is allocated also to support the development of local 
know-how and facilitate the birth of new start up, and give visibility to other initiatives 
from the bottom-up. This campaign has so far been successful in overcoming the initial 
concerns.  
 
Telenor has a publicly available and advanced policy for the protection of human rights.10 
Telenor is member of the Telecommunication Industry Dialogues, 11  a consortium of 
telecom companies, 12  which in March 2013 released a joint document on “Guiding 
Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy.” (Telecommunications Industry Dialogue, 
2013). The company also released a policy document, in which it publicly commits to 
protect its subscribers’ freedom of expression and privacy, and to avoid the shutting down 
of its services. Telenor, however, does disclose that shutting down services may occur in 
                                                
9 “Responding to Buddhist nationalists, Myanmar looks to restrict inter-faith marriage” Human Right Watch, 
3 July 2014. Available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/03/responding-buddhist-nationalists-
myanmar-looks-restrict-inter-faith-marriage ; 
10 Available at: http://www.telenor.com/sustainability/human-rights/ 
11 More information available at: http://www.telecomindustrydiaologue.org 
12 Including: Alcatel-Lucent, AT&T, Millicom, NSN, Orange, Telesoniera, Telefonica, Telenor, Vodafone 
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“extraordinary events” due to national security threats, without clarifying further which are 
the national security threats justifying this. New concerns raised in June 2014, when 
Telenor – the second largest telecom operator in Thailand – accepted the Thai military 
junta’s request to stop its subscribers’ access to Facebook.13 Regarding the protection of 
users’ privacy and disclosing information about its subscribers, Telenor links its policy to 
the “UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.” (United Nations, 2011). The 
company, however, keeps doors open to disclosing customer information when a 
governmental request is considered appropriate, though the company does not specify 
what conditions are deemed appropriate.  
 
In sum, in a context of political transition and, as described in details below, the lack of a 
national law regulating data retention in Myanmar, both Telenor and Ooredoo will have the 
opportunity to demonstrate their corporate social responsibility by securing freedom of its 
services and the privacy of its customers. However, although Myanmar assigned the mobile 
licenses in June 2013, both operators only received their licenses and permission to 
implement their mission on January 30, 2014. This delay was caused by the absence of a 
national telecom law in Myanmar required to set the rules for the licensing process and the 
conditions of the national telecom market. As a result, Ooredoo and Telenor launched 
their connectivity plans at the beginning of 2014, and started offering services in the 
summer of that year. In May 2015 Telenor counts 6.4 million subscribers, Ooredoo 3.3 
million customers, and the already existing national mobile operator MPT partnering with 
the Japanese KDDI leads the market with its 10 million subscribers. 
 
2.2 - Telecom Reform 
 
Before fully developing connectivity, Myanmar had first set the rules for telecom 
infrastructure construction and safeguarding citizens’ rights. Given the uncertain political 
climate and the need to establish necessary conditions for securing telecom developments, 
releasing a telecom law is a key priority that should have anticipated both the construction 
of connectivity infrastructure and the launch of mobile services. 
 
                                                
13 The Citizen Lab, “Information controls during Thailand’s 2014 Coup”, July 9, 2014. Available at:  
https://citizenlab.org/2014/07/information-controls-thailand-2014-coup/ 
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Discussions about the new telecom law slowed down the country’s connectivity agenda, 
but its release was still a key preliminary priority, and a milestone of the connectivity 
development in the country. Moreover, as argued below, the process attached to the release 
of this law opened an unprecedented, innovative, transparent and inclusive process of 
reform in Myanmar, in line with best practices in telecom reform. 
 
a) A multi-stakeholder approach in telecom reform 
 
A draft version of a new telecom law was developed with the close support of the World 
Bank which is highly involved in the connectivity plan of the country,14 and has been 
released and circulated to stakeholders, allowing us to draw some preliminary evaluations. 
Following one of the key “best practices” in telecom reform, the Myanmar government 
implemented the new telecom law through a public and inclusive process, which involves 
multiple actors and welcomes their recommendations. In particular, the government 
launched an open consultation on this law in order to facilitate a public debate on new 
regulatory laws, aiming to ensure a free and open telecom market. 
 
The draft law was made available online in English 15  for public consultation from 
November 4th to December 2nd 2013. The publication of the law in English language 
made clear that the goal of the government was to enhance dialogues with international 
actors, creating an opportunity for third parties to access the law and submit their 
comments. However, given the fact that the law has not been published in Burmese 
dramatically limited the capability of national actors to take part in the consultation, and 
excluded most of the population from understanding and partaking in this telecom reform. 
As a result, 21 different parties, including international telecom companies (e.g. Ericson), 
mobile operators (e.g. Telenor, Ooredoo, KDDI, and Orange), international NGOs (e.g. 
Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, LIRNEasia), local civil society organizations 
(e.g. MIDO), and foreign governments (namely the U.S. government), submitted their 
policy recommendations. 16  
                                                
14 “Myanmar Moves Toward Connectivity for All”, World Bank, 6 February 2014. Available at:  
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/02/06/myanmar-moves-toward-connectivity-for-
all 
15 Available at: http://www.myanmarpublicconsultation.com/ 
16 Available at: http://www.myanmarpublicconsultation.com/Nov2013/ 
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Submitted comments generally acknowledged Myanmar’s efforts to open a public 
consultation and make the development of a telecom law a more transparent and open 
procedure. Myanmar’s initiative is indeed no small feat. After years of an autocratic regime, 
this transparent and inclusive process opens up new spaces of dialogues between 
governments, citizens, and international companies. Moreover, this created an opportunity 
for parties to publicly commit to and position themselves in Myanmar telecom reform 
discussion. This may be an opportunity to facilitate the eventual strengthening of synergies 
and collaborations among all actors, especially domestic ones, involved in this process. As 
the debate on internet freedom in Myanmar has just begun, this is an important first step in 
developing cooperation for future policy debates on telecom in the country. 
 
 
b) Analysing the Telecom Law  
 
With the release of the draft version of this law, the government has expressed its aims to 
establish a fair, open, and transparent national telecom market. The law sets rules 
concerning 5 key issues: 1. Licensing: Defining the process to be applied for each licensing 
category and identifying its criteria; 2. Access and interconnection: Setting the rules ensuring a 
liberal and free networked connectivity and facilitating access to infrastructure and services; 
3. Spectrum: Describing the criteria for the management and assignment of radio spectrum, 
including a variety of service such as mobile voices, broadband, and WiFi; 4. Numbering: 
Defining the criteria for the allocation of numbering according to area and operators; 5. 
Competition: Setting the rules of the internal market competition. 
 
The open consultation on the telecom law has been successful at creating open and 
transparent dialogue, and most stakeholders responded positively to the proposed version 
of the telecom law. Overall, concerning reactions on the telecom law, given the variety of 
actors involved in Myanmar’s connectivity reform plan, reactions to expectations about this 
law and are equally diverse.  
 
Amongst the private companies that submitted comments, recommendations differ depending 
on whether the company is an international mobile operator, such as Ooeredo and Telenor, 
or a hardware supplier, such as mobile towers suppliers. In particular, while mobile 
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operators primarily commented on the licensing procedure and the management of their 
services, mobile tower supply companies called for easier land assignment processes for 
tower construction. Land assignment for the construction of mobile towers is a key 
component of overcoming geographical barriers and extending network coverage, 
especially in rural areas. As discussed in more detail below, this is one of the major 
challenges that both the government and mobile operators need to face in the coming 
months. In particular, mobile tower builders demand a feasible plan making the assignment 
of lands smooth, which takes into account the general lack of a national register of land 
property. In addition to the fact that armed conflicts and landmines affect a significant part 
of the territory, the issue of building the physical infrastructure might constitute the major 
challenge for the tower building process, and it risks to seriously slow down the 
development of the connectivity infrastructure. At the same time, companies had no major 
concerns regarding the proposed telecom law, and came to a general agreement on the 
rules already included in the law, with only minor comments and recommendations. 
 
Similar to industry stakeholders, foreign governments, namely the US, welcomed the telecom 
law and the transparent process of the open consultation. In a concise report, the US 
Government supports most of the points included in law, and encourages to take further 
initiatives to enhance a transparent and open national telecom market competition.17 
 
In contrast, civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) raised some disagreements 
on the draft law. Groups within this sector indicate that the law primarily pleases 
international investors, establishing obstacles for the development of bottom up local 
services by defining entry market conditions that big international companies can easily 
respect, but not local investors. In particular, civil society concerns illuminate that the law 
provides that parties able to offer infrastructure and hardware network platform, defined as 
Network Facilities Service, are automatically entitled to receive their license to provide 
downstream services. Stakeholders have expressed that local investors are hardly in the 
position to offer Network Facilities Service, creating unequal competition rule, making this 
                                                
17  U.S. Government, 2013. “Comments on Telecom Law from U.S. Government”. Available at: 
http://03861b4.netsolhost.com/Nov2013/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/19-US-Govt-comments.pdf 
Internet Governance Capacity Building in Pot-Authoritarian Contexts. Telecom Reform & Human Rights in Myanmar – Andrea Calderaro 
 15 
stipulation in the law a serious obstacle for the development of bottom up local online 
services.18  
 
However, some have pointed out concerns, including the role paid by the World Bank. In a 
document signed by 61 civil society organizations, the World Bank is criticized for having 
failed in securing the right of freedom of expression and digital privacy even before 
launching a telecom reform.19 In particular, given the leading role taken in the telecom 
development in Myanmar, the World Bank is called on to first secure digital privacy, 
regulating data retention, and secure the internet infrastructure before developing the 
telecom sector in the country as it is currently happening. Another major concern 
expressed by multiple parties involves the interconnection among national 
telecommunication bodies. In order to ensure a transparent and open telecom market, 
governments are supposed to withdraw from a regulatory role. According to best practices 
in telecom reforms (International Telecommunication Union, 2011), an independent 
regulator must take over this role. The distinction between an independent regulatory body 
and the government’s role in regulation has not been established yet. As result, the 
Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications Department (MPTD) controlled by the MCIT 
still hold this role. The law designs a regulatory system composed of a complex hierarchical 
structure in which the government appears to be involved, especially in the licensing 
process. Here, although the licensing procedures are managed by the MPTD, its final 
outcome will be still communicate and finally evaluated by the MCIT. This hierarchical 
regulatory system proposed exposes the licensing process to several weaknesses including a 
complex bureaucracy machine, which will likely hinder its efficiency; and increased room 
for corruption. Most importantly, the proposed regulatory system maintains the central role 
of the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, which could result in 
                                                
18 MIDO, 2013. “Recommendations on Proposed Rules for Telecommunication Sector from Myanmar ICT 
for Development Organization”. Available at: http://03861b4.netsolhost.com/Nov2013/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/12-Myanmar-ICT-for-Development-Organization-comments.pdf  
19 US Campaign for Burma “Civil Society Comments to World Bank Telecom Sector Reform Project in 
Burma” 21/01/2014. Available at: 
http://uscampaignforburma.org/images/Civil_Society_Comment_on_the_World_Bank_Telecom_Sector_R
eform_Project_in_Burma.pdf 
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political control over the national telecom market, and the services of mobile operators.20 
The establishment of an independent regulator is considered therefore key to the success 
of Myanmar’s connectivity building, and is the last step of the country’s three step 
approach to telecom reform. 
 
3.3 - Independent Regulator 
 
Concerns raised about the national regulator’s lack of independence are justified, also 
considering that an established independent regulator is still absent. Currently the 
regulatory body in Myanmar is the state controlled Posts and Telecommunications 
Department (PTD), a department within the Ministry of Communication and Information 
Technology (MCIT). 21  Before the telecom reforms, the country’s public monopoly on 
telecoms partially justified the PTD as a regulatory (International Telecommunication 
Union, 2011), however, given the opening of the national market, the urgency to establish a 
new regulatory independent body is commonly shared among civil society parties and 
international observers.  
 
Defining the separation between a regulatory body and the government is commonly 
considered to be necessary to secure the independency and the neutrality of the telecom 
market, and protect international investors and the citizens of Myanmar. In the 
Telecommunications Regulation Handbook, the ITU (2011) posits that an ideal regulatory 
structure must be divided into three main functions (policy development, market 
development, and regulation) that are overseen by parties independent from each other. 
This regulatory framework includes:  
 
1) The government, and its executive branch, which should hold a policy development 
function. In Myanmar, this is described as the second step in the connectivity process, and 
the government is indeed leading the discussion of the described telecom law;  
                                                
20 LIRNEasia, 2013. Response to the “Public Consultation Issued by the Ministry of Communications and 
Information Technology of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar”. Available at: 
http://03861b4.netsolhost.com/Nov2013/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/9-LIRNEasia-comments.pdf 
21 Available at: http://www.mcpt.gov.mm/mcpt/about-01.htm 
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2) Private telecommunication operators which are in charge of developing the market, and 
offering services to citizens. In Myanmar, this is described as the first step in the 
connectivity process, and is filled by both Ooredoo and Telenor. 
3) A separate regulatory authority which should be in charge of monitoring and regulating the 
implementation of the telecom law, securing the efficiency of the market for investors, and 
the quality of services for citizens. 
 
A separate regulatory authority, here identified as the third step in Myanmar’s connectivity 
agenda, is still missing. Multiple parties calls on this to be the key priority in facilitating a 
transparent telecom framework that is independent from the government and the 
government’s political agenda. The major current challenges in establishing an independent 
regulator is the lack of local competences to develop a national telecom regulator. The time 
required to launch an independent regulator would involve long training, which would slow 
down the implementation of the current connectivity plan. According to the time required 
to develop local know how, the draft law clarifies that the establishment of the regulatory 
body will happen within 2 years since the launch of the telecom law. Therefore, this 
expects to happen by 2016. As the existence of a regulatory body is important in securing 
the efficiency of other steps in the reform process, criticism is raised on the fact that the 
“step three” is happening inconveniently late. Furthermore, in the draft law, the process of 
establishing the regulatory body is not fully detailed, and clarifications must be further 
addressed.  
 
An independent regulatory is perceived to be critical in Myanmar as the country’s 
connectivity building and policy framework as highly controlled by the government who, at 
this point in time, still needs to work towards full accountability. This is not necessarily a 
threat to the Myanmar telecom framework and its subscribers, but it should be considered 
a serious weakness to the overall reform process. According to commonly shared concerns, 
and here discussed standard best practices in telecom reform, establishing an independent 
telecom regulator remains therefore one of the next challenges for Myanmar’s connectivity 
development. However, as addressed below, many other challenges, and some with major 
priorities, need to be faced in order to further strengthen the connectivity building process 
in the country. 
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4.  Next Infrastructural and Policy Challenges 
 
Although the current connectivity building plan seems to be moving forward, this is 
anyway far from being finalized and several further challenges need to be faced in future 
stages of this connectivity agenda. We can group challenges that need to be further 
addressed in the on-going connectivity plan in Myanmar into two major perspectives: 
developing connectivity infrastructure and the policy governing it. 
 
4.1 Infrastructure Implementations 
 
Building Mobile Towers: Land Ownership, Landmines, and conflict areas 
With its 676.000 Km2, Myanmar is the second largest country in South East Asia, second 
only to Indonesia. Only approximately 7.000.000 out of its approximately 60.000.000 
habitants live in the three major cities; the capital Nay Pyi Taw, Yangon and Mandalay. 
This data sheds light on how connecting Myanmar will consist of developing telecom 
infrastructures mostly in the widest rural territory of the country. In order to reach this goal, 
it has been estimated that approximately 8.000 mobile towers need to be built. 22 
Unfortunately, both Ooredoo and Telenor did not agree on the sharing of the mobile 
towers, meaning that 8.0000 towers will be built by each company, rising the estimated final 
number of mobile towers to be built to 16.000.  
In Myanmar the land ownership is not rigorously tracked by the government, and land 
owners cannot provide evidence of their ownership of the land. According to the new 
telecom law, the government is in charge to mediate between mobile towers builders and 
land owners, in order to finally release licences to build the mobile infrastructure. The lack 
of accountable documentation, and of a record of land property, will seriously slow down 
the capability of the government to release licenses to build mobile towers. This will likely 
delay the connectivity development in rural areas.  
Moreover, landmines affect a significant part of Myanmar territory. Although clean-up 
campaigns have been launched, these territories are for the moment not secure, and 
therefore excluded from the connectivity plans of both international companies.  
                                                
22 Figures gathered from interviews conducted in February 2014 with CEOs of Telenor and Ooredoo. 
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Finally, several armed conflicts are active in Myanmar, and several regions are not 
controlled by the national government. Since the democratization process started, 
ceasefires have been signed, although these territories are still controlled by armed groups. 
Building mobile towers in rural area consists of positioning them on the highest peaks of 
areas. In conflict regions these are however strategic points for military purposes, and 
therefore controlled by local armed groups. This makes mobile operators not able to build 
telecom infrastructure in these regions, without careful diplomatic actions by the Myanmar 
government in the ceasefire negotiations.23 
 
Government monopoly on the Internet Infrastructure 
This paper has mostly addressed what has been done concerning the development of 
mobile infrastructure. 4G and 3G services promised by Ooredoo and Telenor will increase 
the development of mobile data transferring and it will increase the internet services. 
However, internet infrastructure should develop also over further levels.  
The MPT fully controls the internet infrastructure in different ways. In Myanmar there are 
no Internet Exchange Points (IXs) as such. However, such a function is substituted by a 
government-controlled national gateway which keeps the data flowing domestically and 
maintaining Myanmar independent from the Thai, Malaysian or Chinese infrastructure, 
functioning de facto as an IX. Given that the government controls the only IX of the 
country, it is also in the position to monitor all domestic data flows, exposing the national 
internet infrastructure to risk such as data filtering and violation of digital privacy. New 
ISPs entering the broadband market will have to grapple with this situation, until the 
government dismantles this control, or new IXs will be built. To this day, under such 
infrastructural conditions, the internet in Myanmar cannot be considered fully secure for its 
citizens.  
At the same time, the broadband capability relies on only one submarine cable serving 
Myanmar. In order to increase the broadband capability of the country, in March 2014 the 
MPT joined the SEA-ME-WE-5 consortium which will in the next 2 years construct a new 
20.000 Km submarine cable connecting over 17 countries between Europe and South East 
                                                
23 See the Myanmar Peace Monitor for more details: http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/ 
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Asia. 24  With its 100Gbs technology, this will significantly improve the connectivity 
capability of the region, and this will be a major improvement in particular for Myanmar. 
However, also here, the fact that the Government will be the only controller of such 
infrastructure, force new potential ISPs aiming to offer their services in the country to buy 
the broadband through the Government, condition that does not create the base for more 
open and secure national internet infrastructure. 
 
4.2 Policy Implementations 
I have already discussed some of the criticism raised on the current telecom law, but some 
issues are not regulated in this law, calling for the implementation of new regulations. 
 
Legislation for the governance of internet infrastructure 
As mentioned above, new regulations should be implemented in order to decrease the 
government control of the national broadband in order to facilitate new ISPs entering the 
market, and secure their independency. 
 
Right to Privacy 
The new telecom law, and Myanmar legislation in general, also lacks of a regulation 
protecting citizen privacy, and data retention in general. The newly licensed mobile 
operators, namely Telenor, clarify their policy by stating that they secure the privacy of 
their subscribers in respect of local legislation. However, the lack of legislation in Myanmar 
does not help companies to respect their commitment, and it does not protect citizens. A 
new regulation concerning the right of privacy should therefore be developed.  
 
Cybercrime laws 
Regulation on cybercrime is included in the Electronic Transaction Law (ETL) released in 
2004, namely before the democratization process and therefore the launch of the 
connectivity plan. The ETL was reviewed in October 2013, keeping however the definition 
of cybercrime vague, making most of online behaviours falling in the category of 
cybercrime, and therefore punishable. In order to avoid a misleading use of the law and 
                                                
24 More detailed information available at: 
http://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2014/03/07/cable-compendium-a-guide-
to-the-weeks-submarine-and-terrestrial-developments/ 
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consequent abuses, the release of a new ETL should rather better define the borders of 
online behaviour which can be considered as violations. 
 
Online Hate Speech  
I have already mentioned how conflict between Buddhists and the Muslim minority is 
dramatically increasing, leading to episodes of violence across the country. In this regard, 
the spread of connectivity and the use of social media are creating new ways of circulating 
information, but also rumours and fake violent pictures, aiming to radicalize this conflict. 
On 2nd July 2014, following a rumour circulating on Facebook about a Buddhist woman 
raped by a Muslim, violent riots exploded in Mandalay, culminating in the death of two 
people. As a result, on the third day of riots, Facebook was shut down for almost 12 
hours.25 Although the internet penetration rate in Myanmar is still limited, internet users 
massively use Facebook, and the riots lends evidence of the impact that social media has on 
society. In this context, telecom operators and digital intermediaries are called to play a role 
in easing this potential conflict. We should expect that new initiatives will be taken to 
control the spread of online hate speech, and new regulations must be designed in order to 
avoid that shutting down internet services will be an easy practice in the name of stopping 
hate speech.  
 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Myanmar is in transition, and has the opportunity to ensure that the development of 
telecom infrastructure goes hand in hand with implementing freedoms and digital rights for 
its citizens. Ooredoo and Telenor must play a role in both developing telecommunication 
infrastructures, and ensuring this development follows a new regulatory policy agenda that 
prides itself on removing limits to freedom of expression and enhancing digital freedoms. 
In the coming years, Myanmar has the opportunity to establish real and sustainable change, 
and Ooredoo and Telenor are called to properly address their dual responsibilities in this 
telecom development process. 
 
Developing local know-how 
The limited local competences involved in the domestic telecom policy process is a major 
obstacle for development of a debate open to multiple parties. As mentioned above, the 
                                                
25  “Facebook Problems Coincide With Curfew in Burma”, Irrawaddy, 4 July 2014. Available at: 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/facebook-problems-coincide-curfew-burma.html 
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lack of local know-how has been an obstacle for setting an independent regulator, and 
prevents citizens from following developments. Lack of know-how also affects the 
government which fully depends on interventions of external actors like the World Bank. 
For these reasons, the development of local know-how, including both civil society 
organizations and high level expertise working hand in hand with companies and 
international institutions is a priority for enhancing public debate on telecom developments 
in Myanmar. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Given the limited time since the start of the democratisation process, the current national 
connectivity building plan is moving forward in an unprecedented way for Myanmar. This 
paper explores how this is happening from both an infrastructural and a policy perspective 
along a three step approach. Looking at connectivity building happening in Myanmar 
within the framework the broader Internet Governance discourse, this paper scrutinizes 
the role of the Myanmar government, together with other actors, in this process. Here, 
although the apparent commitment of the government to strictly follow commonly shared 
norms concerning telecom reform and connectivity building, the development of the digital 
infrastructure and its governance is still fully controlled by the government. As argued 
above, according to the commonly shared best practice in telecom reform and Internet 
Governance discourse, the hegemonic role of the government in Myanmar exposes the fast 
developing national digital connectivity to some fragility for the right of privacy and online 
free speech for the citizens. Between the techno-determinist and state-centric approach 
proposed above, typically characterizing telecom reform and connectivity building, the 
Myanmar case clearly fits in this latter stream of empirical cases. In a country still in 
political transition, following decades of autocracy and isolation, ITU best practices in 
Internet Governance hold that the government should withdraw from its controlling and 
monopolistic role. On another hand, new entered telecom companies have just started to 
operate in the country, and they will certainly have the opportunities to give evidence to the 
respect of their corporate social responsibility. The fact that international actors have been 
involved in the other steps of the national connectivity plan – notably the World Bank for 
the design of the telecom law – indicates that internet governance norms have been 
implemented mostly from external actors via a top-down approach. Local civil society 
organizations are monitoring the development of this process with limited resources, and 
are in the process of enhancing their capacity to react to the fast developing complex issues 
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discussed at the various levels of this connectivity process. The development of such a 
grassroots internet policy understanding is crucial to developing a systematic monitoring of 
such a process, and ensure a bottom-up perspective on such an going process. 
 
The general election scheduled for the autumn 2015 may be a turning point for 
strengthening the democratic path already initiated in Myanmar. Approaching this critical 
event with an efficient telecom infrastructure and dramatically higher connectivity rate 
could facilitate the development of initiatives for mobilizing voters and supporting a fair 
and transparent election. In other words, as is commonly held, more connectivity can be an 
important tool for supporting the on-going democratic process. If telecom reform is finally 
fully implemented, mobile operators respect their corporate social responsibility, and the 
last key initiatives that need to be taken to secure a domestic internet connectivity from 
both infrastructural and policy level, we will be able to observe the quickest construction of 
telecom infrastructure ever taking place. This in turn, will potentially lead us to consider 
connecting Myanmar as an opportunity, rather than as new means of control, and an 
important tool to ensure positive democratization.  
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